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ARTICLE  
 
Against Totalitarianism: Agamben, Foucault, and the Politics of Critique 
C. Heike Schotten, University of Massachusetts Boston 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Despite appearances, Agamben’s engagement with Foucault in Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life is not an extension of Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics but ra-
ther a disciplining of Foucault for failing to take Nazism seriously. This moralizing rebuke is 
the result of methodological divergences between the two thinkers that, I argue, have fun-
damental political consequences. Re-reading Foucault’s most explicitly political work of the 
mid-1970s, I show that Foucault’s commitment to genealogy is aligned with his commitment 
to “insurrection”—not simply archival or historical, but practical and political insurrection—
even as his non-moralizing understanding of critique makes space for the resistances he 
hopes to proliferate. By contrast, Agamben’s resurrection of sovereignty turns on a moraliz-
ing Holocaust exceptionalism that anoints both sovereignty and the state with inevitably 
totalitarian powers. Thus, while both Agamben and Foucault take positions “against” totali-
tarianism, their very different understandings of this term and method of investigating it 
unwittingly render Agamben complicit with the totalitarianism he otherwise seeks to reject.  
 
 
And if I don’t say what needs to be done, it isn’t because I believe there is nothing to be 
done. On the contrary, I think there are a thousand things that can be done, invented, con-
trived by those who, recognizing the relations of power in which they are involved, have 
decided to resist or escape them. From that viewpoint, all my research rests on a postulate 
of absolute optimism. I don’t construct my analyses in order to say, “This is the way 
things are, you are trapped.” I say these things only insofar as I believe it enables us to 
transform them. Everything I do is done with the conviction that it may be of use. 
 
    Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault”1 
 
Some years ago, I had written that the West's political paradigm was no longer the city 
state, but the concentration camp, and that we had passed from Athens to Auschwitz. It 
                                                     
1 Michel Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault” in Paul Rabinow (ed.), Power: Essential Works of Fou-
cault 1954-1984 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994 [1978]), 294-5. 
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was obviously a philosophical thesis, and not historic recital, because one could not con-
fuse phenomena that it is proper, on the contrary, to distinguish. 
       I would have liked to suggest that tattooing at Auschwitz undoubtedly seemed the 
most normal and economic way to regulate the enrolment and registration of deported 
persons into concentration camps. The bio-political tattooing the United States imposes 
now to enter its territory could well be the precursor to what we will be asked to accept 
later as the normal identity registration of a good citizen in the state's gears and mecha-
nisms. That's why we must oppose it. 
 
    Agamben, “No to Biopolitical Tattooing”2 
 
 
  
Agamben stages his widely-cited Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life3 as, in part, a dis-
agreement with Foucault. Citing the end of Volume I of The History of Sexuality, Agamben 
notes that for Foucault, the “threshold of modernity” is reached when politics becomes bio-
politics—when power exercises control not simply over the bodies of living beings, but, in 
fact, regulates, monitors, and manufactures the life and life processes of those living beings.4 
Agamben agrees with Foucault that modern politics is biopolitics, but disagrees that biopol-
itics is distinctly modern. Instead, Agamben argues that biopolitics is as old as politics itself, 
because politics—at least in its Western version—is effectively a politics of sovereignty, and 
sovereignty, in Agamben’s view, is inherently biopolitical.  
Agamben attributes his disagreement with Foucault in part to what he sees as Fou-
cault’s surprising failure to engage Hannah Arendt, Foucault’s near-contemporary and 
someone who, although having meditated extensively on modern biopolitics in The Human 
Condition,5 herself neglected to apply these same insights to her The Origins of Totalitarian-
ism.6 What both thinkers fail to account for, in Agamben’s view, is not the emergence of bio-
politics (“which is, in itself, absolutely ancient”), but rather “the politicization of bare life as 
such,” which Agamben names the truly “decisive moment of modernity.”7 That both Fou-
cault and Arendt omit this important event from their work is symptomatic of what Agam-
ben calls, rather enigmatically, “the difficulties and resistances that thinking had to encoun-
ter in this area.”8 The task of Homo Sacer, then, is to reconcile these two thinkers’ biopolitical 
theory in order to understand the decisive moment of modernity. Presenting himself as the 
third corner of this philosophical triangle, Agamben installs Homo Sacer as the site wherein 
                                                     
2 Giorgio Agamben, “No to Bio-Political Tattooing,” Le Monde Diplomatique (Jan. 10, 2004). 
3 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, 1998). Hereafter, appears as HS in text. 
4 See Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. I: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vin-
tage, 1978), 143. Hereafter, appears as HSI in text. 
5 Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). 
6 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1973). 
7 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 4.  
8 Ibid., 4; cf. 120. 
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Arendt’s and Foucault’s insights will be adequately fused: “The concept of ‘bare life’ or ‘sa-
cred life’ is the focal lens through which we shall try to make their points of view con-
verge.”9    
However compelling, Agamben’s proposed philosophical consolidation here is not 
what he actually accomplishes, or even really sets out to do, in Homo Sacer. Rather, Agam-
ben seeks to discipline Foucault for failing to take into account the “penetrating” analyses of 
totalitarianism proffered by Arendt almost twenty years before Volume I of The History of 
Sexuality.10 In other words, while Foucault is called to task for overlooking Arendt, Arendt is 
faulted for not recognizing the importance of her own insights and relating them to one an-
other. Thus, Agamben notes, Foucault’s argument will have to be not only “corrected” but 
also “completed” insofar as it fails to recognize what Arendt already understood to be latent 
in the modern replacement of bios with zoē as its central political concern. Homo Sacer is thus 
neither an incorporation of nor a substantive engagement with Foucault. It is, instead, a dis-
pute with Foucault and, more precisely, a corrective of Foucault. This corrective demands 
that Agamben turn our attention to “the exemplary places of modern biopolitics” on which 
Foucault “never dwelt”: “the concentration camp and the structure of the great totalitarian 
states of the twentieth century.”11  
If we examine these more appropriate foci of contemporary biopolitical investiga-
tion, Agamben argues, we become able to recognize the horrifying reality that defines con-
temporary politics: every political space has now become a “camp.” For Agamben, the camp 
is the place wherein law is nothing but an empty signifier and all life is reduced to bare ex-
istence, the zoē upon which sovereign decisionism may act as it chooses and without conse-
quence. The dramatic suggestion of Homo Sacer is that the camp, no longer even a demarcat-
able place anymore, has become coterminous with the very domain of the earth, and every 
human being has been reduced to the status of bare life.12 Foucault, then, is guilty not simp-
ly of theoretical or historical oversight. In remaining silent about or oblivious to the most 
significant political phenomena of the 20th century, Foucault is lax with regard to, if not po-
tentially complicit with, the very biopolitical machinations he should have been document-
ing (and, it seems, condemning). As Agamben observes later, “The inquiry that began with a 
reconstruction of the grand enfermement in hospitals and prisons did not end with an analy-
sis of the concentration camp.”13  
Agamben’s disciplining of Foucault regarding the proper locus and diagnosis of 
modern biopolitics is an essentially moralizing exercise that almost completely sidelines or 
obviates the specific content of Foucault’s work. Such oversight is more than academic; it 
has significant political consequences. In this article, I argue that Agamben effects a return 
to sovereignty via a rejection of a Foucaultian methodology that I describe as emancipatory 
                                                     
9 Ibid., 120. 
10 Ibid., 3-4; 119-120. 
11 Ibid., 4. 
12 Ibid., 38, 139-40. 
13 Ibid., 119. 
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in its commitment to the excavation of knowledges from below. As we will see, although both 
thinkers appear concerned about the power relations they document and may even wish to 
galvanize their readership to action of some sort,14 Agamben’s methodology ultimately fore-
closes the very resistance he seeks to cultivate, even as Foucault’s non-moralizing under-
standing of critique makes space for the resistances he hopes to proliferate. As a result, alt-
hough both Agamben and Foucault take positions “against” totalitarianism, their very dif-
ferent understandings of this term and divergent methodological approaches result in 
Agamben’s unwitting resurrection of sovereignty in precisely the totalitarian form he oth-
erwise seeks to reject.  
 
I. The Return to Sovereignty 
To date, many have observed the substantial differences between Agamben and Foucault on 
the questions of biopolitics, sovereignty, life, and law.15 These differences include diver-
gences of method, epistemology, metaphysics, politics, ontology, and normativity. To my 
mind, the most obvious and, for the purposes of this article, the most important difference 
between Agamben and Foucault is in their respective conceptualizations and methodologi-
cal use of the term sovereignty. This divergence is important not simply because Agamben 
claims to be beginning from and further developing Foucault’s line of argument, but also 
insofar as it has significant consequences for the practical possibilities of everyday political 
resistance. 
As is well-known, in Homo Sacer, Agamben adopts Carl Schmitt’s definition of the 
sovereign as “he who decides on the exception.”16 Simultaneously, however, Agamben 
overlays this definition with a particular biopolitical reading of the history of Western poli-
                                                     
14 Wendy Brown lumps Agamben in with Hardt and Negri as a “radical” who seeks to “develop a politics 
opposed to sovereignty” (Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2010), 54), while Negri calls Agamben “a revolutionary” whose turn to biopolitics may well be motivated 
by “the influence of Foucault” and “the importance of his thought for many young Europeans in the 
1990s” (Negri, “Giorgio Agamben: The Discreet Taste of the Dialectic,” in Matthew Calarco and Steven 
DeCaroli (eds.), Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 120). Mi-
chael Dillon sees Agamben’s work as a “betrayal” of Foucault, but precisely because he shares Foucault’s 
“cause” of developing “dissent” to biopolitics and “a positively different living of life” (Dillon, “Cared to 
Death: The Biopoliticised Time of Your Life,” Foucault Studies, no. 2 (May 2005), 45). Meanwhile, Julian 
Reid sees “Society” as initiating the question of how we might “engage otherwise” with the modern bio-
politics of war and security (Reid, “War, Discipline and Biopolitics,” in Stephen Morton and Stephen By-
grave (eds.), Foucault in an Age of Terror: Essays on Biopolitics and the Defence of Society (New York: Palgrave, 
2008), 28).   
15 See, e.g., Thomas Lemke, “‘A Zone of Indistinction’: A Critique of Giorgio Agamben’s Concept of Bio-
politics,” Outlines: Critical Practice Studies, vol. 7, no. 1 (2005); Mika Ojakangas, “Impossible Dialogue on 
Bio-power: Agamben and Foucault,” Foucault Studies, no. 2 (May 2005); Dillon, “Cared to Death”; Paul 
Patton, “Agamben and Foucault on Biopower and Biopolitics,” in Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life; 
Catherine Mills, “Biopolitics, Liberal Eugenics, and Nihilism,” in Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life. 
16 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, translated by George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1985), 5. 
Foucault Studies, No. 20, pp. 155-179. 
 
 159 
tics, wherein “the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original—if con-
cealed—nucleus of sovereign power.”17 Echoing Schmitt, Agamben asserts that “the excep-
tion” lies at the heart of sovereignty. Revising Schmitt, Agamben relates the exception to a 
specifically Arendtian reading of the Aristotelian distinction between life and the good life, 
or “bare life” (“zoē”) and properly political life (“bios”). In this view, “Western politics first 
constitutes itself through an exclusion (which is simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life.”18 
The exception is a relationship between zoē and bios that is simultaneously one of opposition 
as well as “an implication of the first in the second.”19 It is both a segregation of zoē from bios 
and an inclusion of zoē within bios (only) by means of zoē’s exclusion. This structure of biopo-
litical exception, Agamben claims, is not only originary to “Western politics” but, in fact, 
“consubstantial with Western politics.”20 For him, sovereignty is effectively another name for 
Western politics, which is, and incipiently always has been, a kind of decisionism that con-
stitutes the very type and being of the lives of its subjects.  
While Agamben’s rhetoric certainly supports his claim that sovereignty has always 
existed in the same form and in the same way in “the West” (and he even says as much at 
times), there is also a more generous reading of Homo Sacer that sees sovereignty as a series 
of developments or transformations of a given logic that, regardless of how seemingly dis-
parate its forms in various ages may be, are nevertheless symptomatic of the same general-
ized phenomenon of the exceptionalizing of zoē. Indeed, Agamben’s definition of sovereign-
ty is not primarily institutional and instead denotes the abstract, exceptional relationship 
between zoē and bios that, he argues, uniquely characterizes Western politics. In this regard, 
Homo Sacer functions as Agamben’s close reading of the text of Western politics, wherein the 
first articulation of the sovereign exception, in Aristotle, is transformed, through a series of 
emendations, re-writings, and revised rituals of “the sacred” in Roman law (which serves as 
a kind of bridge between Aristotle and modernity), as well as signature moments such as 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the innovation of habeus corpus, into an explicit re-
lationship of biopolitical exception and increasing indistinction between them. Nevertheless, 
Agamben ultimately sees sovereignty as either a trans-historical phenomenon or, at the very 
least, a political configuration that has endured relatively stably and continuously since the 
days of Aristotle.  
For Foucault, by contrast, sovereignty is a relatively recent historical phenomenon, 
both a theory and an actual configuration of power of the feudal monarchy of the Middle 
Ages (and 17th and 18th century resistances to it).21 Sovereignty also names a set of theoretical 
premises or assumptions about power that, in his view, we would do well to leave behind: 
the notion that power is capable of individual possession and transfer, like a commodity 
                                                     
17 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 6. 
18 Ibid., 7. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976, translated by David 
Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 34-5. Hereafter, appears as “SMBD” in text.  
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(the “economism of power” that underlies social contract theory);22 the notion that power 
overall is a unity or capable of overarching unification;23 the articulation of power primarily 
through the vehicle of law;24 the view that subjects pre-exist or are somehow “outside” of 
power;25 and the notion that it is possible to “topple” or overthrow power and emerge on 
the other side of it, into “freedom.”26 In short, we “must not assume that the sovereignty of 
the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are given at the outset; 
rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes.”27 Foucault sums up the sovereign 
model of power as follows: 
 
So we can say that in one way or another—and depending, obviously, upon the different 
theoretical schemata in which it is deployed—the theory of sovereignty presupposes the 
subject; its goal is to establish the essential unity of power, and it is always deployed with-
in the preexisting element of the law. It therefore assumes the existence of three “primi-
tive” elements: a subject who has to be subjectified, the unity of the power that has to be 
founded, and the legitimacy that has to be respected. Subject, unitary power, and law: the 
theory of sovereignty comes into play, I think, among these elements, and it both takes 
them as given and tries to found them.28 
 
While these coordinates may have been adequate to explain the specific features of Europe-
an “feudal-type societies,” they no longer exhaust the realm of political strategy and tech-
nology; hence Foucault’s introduction of discipline, biopower, and—eventually—
governmentality as necessary additives and correlatives to the sovereign edifice.29  
Agamben makes clear that his use of sovereignty is diametrically opposed to Fou-
cault’s on all these counts. First, of course, he equates sovereignty with the state. Agamben 
laments the modern erosion of the State-sovereign equivalence, noting disconsolately that 
                                                     
22 Ibid., 12; Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1, 94. 
23 Ibid., 43-46. 
24 Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1, 83-91; Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended,” 38-40. 
25 Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1, 94; Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended,” 46. 
26 This bitter pill is the sardonic punchline of Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1, the final sentence of 
which declares that the “irony” of the deployment of sexuality “is in having us believe that our ‘liberation’ 
is in the balance” (Foucault, History of Sexuality, 159).  
27 Ibid., 92. 
28 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended,” 44. 
29 Roberto Esposito makes much of the fact that Foucault seems to vacillate as to whether or not biopolitics 
replaces or supplements sovereignty (Esposito, Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy, translated by Timothy Camp-
bell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008)). Yet, Foucault does not intend a “historical sche-
ma” wherein sovereignty is first replaced by discipline and then, shortly thereafter, biopower and securi-
ty; rather, he is chronicling distinctive characteristics of power formations predominant in a given period. 
But, as he notes, discipline exists in the ancient world, the Panopticon can be seen as the great dream of 
sovereignty, mechanisms of security are very old, and the development of new modes of securitization 
and discipline do not simply overwrite or cancel sovereign mechanisms of power (Foucault, Security, Ter-
ritory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: 
Palgrave, 2007), 7-8; hereafter appears as STP in text). 
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“the sovereign is entering into an ever more intimate symbiosis not only with the jurist but 
also with the doctor, the scientist, the expert, and the priest.”30 In appropriating Schmitt’s 
definition of sovereignty, moreover, Agamben shows that Schmitt was the first to grasp the 
ways in which the sovereign exception exposes “nothing less than the limit concept of the 
doctrine of law and the State.”31 Clearly, then, the state and sovereignty are two notions that 
either constitute or entail one another. Second, Agamben’s version of sovereignty, however 
abstract or conceptual, nevertheless functions as an overall unity, both in historical terms, as 
continuous throughout time, and in political terms, as acting through law upon pre-existent 
subjects who are repressed or prohibited by it. So, historically, Agamben makes no secret of 
the fact that his version of sovereignty can be considered to stretch from before the time of 
Aristotle through to the present day. Politically, Agamben makes clear that the subjects of 
sovereign power, riven by a zoē/bios divide that has been attenuated or corrupted over time, 
are acted upon by sovereignty, which is perpetually extending the domain of zoē and dimin-
ishing that of bios, unfolding the inevitable and endlessly iterable logic of the zoē/bios divide 
itself. Now, whether this exceptional zoē/bios divide is the result of sovereign decisionism (as 
he argues in HS) or simply part and parcel of human subjectivity (as he argues more com-
plexly in Remnants of Auschwitz32), it is nevertheless the case that this divide is consubstantial 
with sovereignty and is not an effect of power but rather coextensive with it. As Thomas 
Lemke aptly sums up, “Agamben subscribes to exactly the juridico-discursive concept of 
power that Foucault has shown to be insufficient for the analysis of modern biopolitics.”33   
Agamben finesses these discrepancies by saying he is attending to yet another aporia 
in Foucault’s work—not the oversight of Hannah Arendt, this time, but rather “the vanish-
ing point” that haunts both Foucault’s thought and indeed “the entire Western reflection on 
power.”34 Agamben acknowledges that Foucault sought to abandon “the traditional ap-
proach to the problem of power, which is based on juridico-institutional models (the defini-
tion of sovereignty, the theory of the State),” in order “to construct an analytic of power that 
would not take law as its model and code.”35 Yet Agamben nonetheless re-asserts these 
terms and this problematic back into Foucault’s text when he complains that the two domi-
nant strands of Foucault’s thought at the end of his life remained without “a common cen-
ter.”36 This “common center” is the place where “political techniques (such as the science of 
the police) with which the State assumes and integrates the care of the natural life of indi-
viduals into its very center” and “technologies of the self”37 converge. This “delicate area” is 
                                                     
30 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 122. 
31 Ibid., 11. 
32 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen (New 
York: Zone Books, 2002). 
33 Lemke, “‘A Zone of Indistinction,’” 4. 
34 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 6. 
35 Ibid., 5. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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the “unitary center”38 Agamben sets out to uncover in Homo Sacer (and uncover it he must 
since, he notes repeatedly, it is both “secret” and “hidden”). This covert capsule of power 
from time immemorial in the West is the structure of the State, and that structure is, as 
Agamben makes clear, the sovereign exception.39 Because Foucault did not recognize the 
sovereign exception as the structure of the state, there is a fundamental lacuna in his 
thought. 
Of course, the fact that Foucault rejects the historical and philosophical premises of 
such a finding might be a more plausible explanation as to why he never alighted on Agam-
ben’s particular diagnosis of modern biopolitics. Yet rather than acknowledge that he and 
Foucault are working with fundamentally different historical and theoretical understand-
ings, Agamben instead documents what he takes to be Foucault’s failure to include the sov-
ereign exception, concluding alternately that Foucault overlooked it, missed it entirely, 
would have noticed it had he read Arendt, died before he could consider it fully, or was 
foiled by the “difficulties and resistances that thinking had to encounter in this area.”40 At a 
minimum, then, Agamben not only ignores Foucault’s critique of sovereignty, but effective-
ly countermands it in an argument that must be understood as effecting a return to sover-
eignty as the central and definitive problem of politics and political theory, at least in “the 
West.”  
 
II. Politics and Method 
Agamben and Foucault differ not simply regarding the historical or philosophical content of 
sovereignty, but also, and more importantly, regarding their method of studying it and the 
politics of these methodological choices. For there is an additional reason that Foucault re-
jects sovereignty as insufficient to explain or describe fully the workings of power beyond 
16th-17th c. monarchical Europe: remaining within its framework stymies projects of re-
sistance. At the beginning of “SMBD,” for example, Foucault declares we “are in a sort of 
bottleneck” if we seek to resist discipline by relying on the old terms and terrain of sover-
eignty: “Having recourse to sovereignty against discipline will not enable us to limit the ef-
fects of disciplinary power.”41 This suggests that resisting discipline is an important project 
for Foucault, or at least one with which he was concerned. “Truth to tell,” he says,  
 
if we are to struggle against disciplines, or rather against disciplinary power, in our search 
for a nondisciplinary power, we should not be turning to the old right of sovereignty; we 
should be looking for a new right that is both antidisciplinary and emancipated from the 
principle of sovereignty.42  
 
                                                     
38 Ibid., 6. 
39 Ibid., 11-12. 
40 Ibid., 7-11. 
41 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended,” 39. 
42 Ibid., 39-40. 
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Similarly, the first volume of The History of Sexuality ends with the warning against celebrat-
ing a sexuality that only re-iterates the terms of our sexual subjectification. The thrill of sex-
ual “liberation,” Foucault insists, only keeps us in thrall to “that austere monarchy of sex.”43 
Instead, he elliptically suggests we investigate alternative configurations of “bodies and 
pleasures.”44 Now, whether or not “bodies and pleasures” constitutes a viable prospect for 
political resistance, its mention at the end of HSI suggests that Foucault is at least aware of 
the political consequences of his critique in this text. In short, it is not simply for historical or 
philosophical reasons that Foucault wishes to dispense with the primacy of the theory of 
sovereignty. It is also for methodological and political reasons that Foucault famously declares 
it is time to “cut off the head of the king”45 and “study power outside the model of Levia-
than.”46 
Notably, Foucault’s most definitively political texts, those from what is sometimes re-
ferred to as his “middle period,” are also characterized by explicit methodological consider-
ations. Foucault’s works on discipline, biopolitics, governmentality, and the state—
Discipline & Punish (1977),47 HSI (1978), “SMBD” (1975-6), STP (1978-9), and The Birth of Bio-
politics (1978-9)48—are very much taken up with methodological concerns, specific methodo-
logical choices, and explicit discussions of method. Some of Foucault’s most famous re-
marks about power are contained in the section on “Method” in HSI, the germs of which 
appear already in D&P and are more fully expanded upon and amplified in “SMBD.” Fou-
cault describes STP as itself a kind of “experiment” in method—his attempt to see if it was 
truly possible to embark upon a history of the state without presuming its existence before-
hand—and BB continues this project by further unpacking neoliberal governmentality. In 
both “SMBD” and STP, Foucault explicitly links his method with genealogy, and character-
izes his prior work as similarly genealogical. As he considers in Lecture 5 of STP, he is at-
tempting to do with regard to the state what he had already undertaken with regard to the 
study of the disciplines, an activity he characterizes as a “triple displacement”49 of institu-
tion, function, and object from the study of technologies and strategies of power. The point 
of the analysis in STP is to undertake these three displacements precisely with regard to the 
                                                     
43 Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1, 159.  
44 A suggestion that has been much mined by feminists and queer theorists for thinking through various 
practices of resistance; see, e.g., Ladelle McWhorter, Bodies and Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Sexual 
Normalization (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); Jana Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, 
Power, and the Body (New York: Routledge, 1991). Judith Butler has suggested that “sexuality and power” 
is a better pairing for this task than “bodies and pleasures”; see Butler, “Revisiting Bodies and Pleasures,” 
Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 16, no. 11 (1999), 19. 
45 Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1, 88-9. 
46 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended,” 34.  
47 Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vin-
tage, 1977). Hereafter, appears as D&P in text. 
48 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, translated by Graham 
Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 2008). Hereafter, appears as BB in text. 
49 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 116. 
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state, to demonstrate “how the emergence of the state as a fundamental political issue can in 
fact be situated within a more general history of governmentality, or, if you like, in the field 
of practices of power.”50  
The point of these three displacements themselves, however, is more generally to de-
institutionalize power and recognize its dispersed workings from below, so as to understand 
and track them better and open up space for resistance. Foucault calls this “methodological 
precaution” an “ascending analysis of power” that begins by studying its “infinitesimal 
mechanisms.”51 It makes resistance possible because it shows that “Major dominations are 
the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these confrontations [i.e., manifold relations of 
force]”52:  
 
Overall domination is not something that is pluralized and then has repercussions down 
below. I think we have to analyze the way in which the phenomena, techniques, and pro-
cedures of power come into play at the lowest levels; we have to show, obviously, how 
these procedures are displaced, extended, and modified and, above all, how they are in-
vested or annexed by global phenomena, and how more general powers or economic ben-
efits can slip into the play of these technologies of power, which are at once relatively au-
tonomous and infinitesimal.53 
 
These smaller, “local” confrontations and strategies of power are unstable, tractable, vulner-
able, reversible. Undertaking the genealogy of power relations from below, then, rather than 
tracking “major dominations” from above, makes clear that major dominations are produced 
by power relations and are neither essential, inevitable, nor strictly causal agents. For exam-
ple, Foucault cautions against offering “a genealogy of the state”54 or proceeding from the 
state as “a transcendent reality whose history could be undertaken on the basis of itself.”55 
Instead, he focuses on various state rationalities (raisons d’état) that, unwittingly and from 
below, collaborate to produce the hegemony of the modern, governmentalized state as its 
distinctive by-product. Foucault is adamant that the state not be taken as a historical given; 
rather, he argues, it is an effect of specific practices of governmentality, and it is these prac-
tices that interest him much more than the state as such.  
One consequence, then, of offering a “history of the state” (or of sovereignty, as 
Agamben has it) is that institutions, discourses, and bodies of knowledge become essential-
ized into universals of human history or politics. They become causes rather than effects.56 
Foucault’s point is that to begin the analysis from these institutions is to reproduce their 
power by acceding to their status as ever-present and causal signifiers. In an elliptical echo 
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of Marx, Foucault reminds us that the state is no more or less than those who make it up 
and the practices and technologies of power that have come to constitute it:  
 
We cannot speak of the state-thing as if it was a being developing on the basis of itself and 
imposing itself on individuals as if by a spontaneous, automatic mechanism. The state is a 
practice. The state is inseparable from the set of practices by which the state actually be-
came a way of governing, a way of doing things, and a way too of relating to govern-
ment.57 
 
Foucault’s point is not that there is “no such thing” as the state, or that the state is not a 
large or powerful political institution. Rather, he is arguing for an analytic approach that 
does not take powerful institutions and political forms to be self-causing and themselves 
causes—in Marx’s terms, a fetish.  
The politics of this particular methodological perspective—which Foucault acknowl-
edges is a perspective, rather than a normative prescription58—is more explicit in the 1975-6 
lecture series, “SMBD.” In both STP and “SMBD,” Foucault aligns his work with genealogy. 
In “SMBD,” however, he presents genealogy itself as a tactic in the struggle against the tyr-
anny of scientific discourses by subjugated knowledges. Foucault offers a disarming pream-
ble to this year of lectures, declaring that his scholarly research has been somewhat haphaz-
ard to this point and confessing that he has trouble explaining it according to any larger 
goal, project, or overall purpose. Although he is hopeful that his readers have found lines of 
continuity in the “fragmented, repetitive, and discontinuous”59 works of the previous years, 
Foucault is clear that, from his vantage point anyway, he was engaged in “the busy inertia 
of those who profess useless knowledge,”60 caught up in “the great, tender, and warm free-
masonry of useless erudition.61 Nevertheless, Foucault says, “it was not just a liking for this 
freemasonry that led me to do what I’ve been doing.”62 He says the work of this time is 
“quite in keeping with a certain period; with the very limited period we have been living 
through for the last ten or fifteen years, twenty at the most.”63 The period Foucault is refer-
ring to, of course, is the great social, cultural, and political upheaval of 1960-1975, including 
May ’68 but also the general global ferment of oppositional and liberatory social, anti-war, 
and anti-colonial movements. Foucault characterizes this period as consisting of a general-
ized attack—in both the intellectual and sociopolitical arenas—against the organizing insti-
tutions of social life (psychiatry, sexual morality, prisons, the state) as well as “totalitarian 
theories” like Marxism and psychoanalysis. “What was it that was everywhere being called 
into question? The way in which power was exercised—not just state power but the power 
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exercised by other institutions and forms of constraint, a sort of abiding oppression in eve-
ryday life.”64  
This generalized attack became possible due to what Foucault calls “the insurrection 
of subjugated knowledges,”65 by which he means both the scholarly excavation of “buried 
or masked” historical records of people and events whose existence contradicts the “func-
tional arrangements or systematic organizations” of power;66 and all those knowledges 
“from below” that have been “disqualified” as knowledges because they lack some kind of 
institutional, scholarly, or other elite credibility.67 Foucault describes these latter knowledges 
as “what people know at a local level.”68 What links these two, otherwise disparate forms of 
knowledge—“the buried and the disqualified”—is that they are both archives of struggle 
that have “been confined to the margins.”69 They would not even have become apparent 
were it not for the general critical ferment of these years that resulted in “the removal of the 
tyranny of overall discourses.”70 In characterizing his work up to and including 1975-76 as 
part of this struggle, Foucault is effectively describing works like D&P as a kind of uncover-
ing of the documentation of the struggles of subordinated knowledges and a facilitation of 
their emergence in support of their insurrection.71 
Even more significantly, Foucault argues that this emancipatory activity is the effect 
of the practice of genealogy, which he opposes to “science.” In these lectures, Foucault ar-
gues that sciences are institutionalized discourses that claim to account for and explain eve-
rything according to a rule or particular rubric for producing truth. Sciences treat all mean-
ing, experience, and knowledge as grist to their mill of verification and confirmation. Fou-
cault refers to these sciences as “totalitarian theories.” His explicit targets are Marxism and 
psychoanalysis; of the former, for example, he says: “we can deduce whatever we like from 
the general phenomenon of the domination of the bourgeois class.”72 Such deductions, he 
says, “are always possible,” but “[t]hey are essentially too facile, because we can [also] say 
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precisely the opposite. We can deduce from the principle that the bourgeoisie became a rul-
ing class that controlling sexuality, and infantile sexuality, is not absolutely desirable. We 
can reach the opposite conclusion and say that what is needed is a sexual apprenticeship, 
sexual training, sexual precocity, to the extent that the goal is to use sexuality to reproduce a 
labor force […].”73 The point, however, is that the answer—whatever it is—always serves to 
reinforce the power/knowledge effects of the scientific discourse that yielded it in the first 
place. This “vanguard” knowledge is what is opposed by genealogies, which Foucault char-
acterizes as “antisciences.”74 By refusing the deductions and truth-mills of sciences and in-
terrogating power from the bottom up, rather than from the top down, genealogies “are 
about the insurrection of knowledges […] against the centralizing power-effects that are 
bound up with the institutionalization and workings of any scientific discourse organized in 
a society such as ours.”75  
In Lecture 2 of “SMBD,” Foucault offers five methodological precautions regarding 
the study of power. These precautions—effectively a further organization of material al-
ready published in the sections “Objective” and “Method” in HSI—must be read within the 
context in which they are presented here; namely, that of understanding scholarly and ar-
chival work as engaged in a political project of struggle, overthrow, and even, perhaps, lib-
eration. In “SMBD,” Foucault characterizes genealogy as “a tactic” of unearthing and de-
scribing the local knowledges that will destabilize totalitarian discourses. Its obvious politi-
cal character is further characterized, by him, as emancipatory:  
 
Compared to the attempt to inscribe knowledges in the power-hierarchy typical of sci-
ence, genealogy is, then, a sort of attempt to desubjugate historical knowledges, to set 
them free, or in other words to enable them to oppose and struggle against the coercion of 
a unitary, formal, and scientific theoretical discourse.76  
 
While Foucault’s enduring skepticism regarding liberation is well-known, it is difficult to 
know how else to describe the activity, erudite or otherwise, of facilitating this renegade 
disruption of “totalitarian discourses.”77 
In describing Foucault’s methodological commitment as emancipatory, I am not sug-
gesting that he is advocating revolutionary struggle as traditionally understood by political 
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theory (Marxist or otherwise), or even that his scholarship itself constitutes a form of revolu-
tionary activity. I mean to make the narrower and more specific claim that, methodological-
ly, Foucault’s understanding of genealogy and his practice of it in this period proceed from 
an essentially political commitment to voices, experiences, and knowledges that are “subju-
gated” or in some sense “below.” Foucault, in other words, is unearthing knowledges from 
below in an attempt to disrupt or disperse “totalitarian” theories, discourses which therefore 
in some sense reign from above. Now, it may seem as though this sort of vertical mapping is 
foreign to Foucault’s thinking about power. As well, the emphasis on the “insurrection of 
subjugated knowledges” sounds dangerously like the repressive model of power relations 
that Foucault has worked so assiduously to sideline in our political thinking.78 Yet it is un-
deniable that Foucault uses precisely such spatialization to mark the relationship between 
“totalitarian theories, or at least—what I mean is—all-encompassing global theories”79 and 
“subjugated knowledges.” So, for example, he says: 
 
When I say “subjugated knowledges” I am also referring to a whole series of knowledges 
that have been disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated 
knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are 
below the required level of erudition or scientificity. And it is thanks to the reappearance 
of these knowledges from below, of these unqualified or even disqualified knowledges, it 
is thanks to the reappearance of these knowledges: the knowledge of the psychiatrized, 
the patient, the nurse, the doctor, that is parallel to, marginal to, medical knowledge, the 
knowledge of the delinquent, what I would call, if you like, what people know (and this is 
by no means the same thing as common knowledge or common sense but, on the contra-
ry, a particular knowledge, a knowledge that is local, regional, or differential, incapable of 
unanimity and which derives its power solely from the fact that it is different from all the 
knowledges that surround it), it is the reappearance of what people know at a local level, 
of these disqualified knowledges, that made the critique possible.80 
 
In addition to the clearly verticalized positioning of subjugated knowledges as “from be-
low” in this passage, I also want to draw attention to the ways in which Foucault character-
izes the knowers of these subjugated knowledges: “the psychiatrized, the patient, the nurse, 
the doctor,” personages who run alongside or in tandem with “medical knowledge, the 
knowledge of the delinquent” and are marginalized by them.81 Domination subjects, then, 
and in both senses—it both produces subjects and subjugates them. However, whether the 
term is subjection, subjectivation, subjugation, or subordination (and Foucault uses all of 
these at various points), the common denominator among them is the prefix sub, meaning 
“under”; “subjugation” literally means “under the yoke.” Therefore, while it is indisputable 
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that Foucault rejects the notion that there are determinate or specific people in power who 
wield it over others the way a king wields a scepter, it does not necessarily follow that Fou-
cault rejects the idea that there are those beneath strategies and imperatives of power who 
are dominated, subordinated, and subjectified by it. Indeed, it is that very subjectification by 
which we can recognize strategies and technologies of power in the first place. I think it is 
clear that Foucault’s methodological and political loyalties are identical here: they lie with 
those below, with those subjugated and subjectified. 
Foucault retains this loyalty because—and this is the other way in which he can be 
said to practice an emancipatory methodology—he is interested in securing a space for po-
litical resistance, for what he so often describes as resistance to the mechanisms of power 
itself (rather than to a specific institution—say, the prison—or to a group of people—say, the 
ruling class). So, when Foucault describes genealogy as the insurrection of subjugated 
knowledges, he makes clear that this insurrection is aimed “not so much at the contents, 
methods, or concepts of a science” but that “above all,” genealogy is “to fight the power-
effects characteristic of any discourse that is regarded as scientific.”82 The purpose of genea-
logical emancipation of subjugated knowledges, in other words, is “to make use of that 
knowledge in contemporary tactics.”83 This is how Foucault carves out a space for intellec-
tual activity and production within political work without thereby anointing the scholar 
with any special or privileged role “from above” as interpreter or galvanizer of the masses. 
For example, in another 1978 interview explicitly focused on method and politics, Foucault 
makes clear that “the problem of the prisons isn’t one for the ‘social workers’ but one for the 
prisoners” because “‘what is to be done’ ought not to be determined from above by reform-
ers, be they prophetic or legislative, but by a long work of comings and goings, of exchang-
es, reflections, trials, different analyses.”84 As Foucault rightly observes, it is only those from 
below, those who are affected by power, who can bring about meaningful transformation—
not Foucault or people like him, much less “reformers.”85 
Indeed, Foucault rejects any privileged position for the intellectual whatsoever, not-
ing that her very implication in academe enlists her in regimes of power she should be en-
gaged in disrupting:  
 
Intellectuals are themselves agents of this system of power […] The intellectual’s role is no 
longer to place himself ‘somewhat ahead and to the side’ in order to express the stifled 
truth of the collectivity; rather, it is to struggle against the forms of power that transform 
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him into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness,’ 
and ‘discourse.’86  
 
Indeed, if the intellectual does have any specific political role to play, her job is to problema-
tize existing and settled conclusions to the point that those in charge no longer know what to 
do. This activity, I would argue, is in service to those below, even if it does not take a position 
as to what they should do (or what should be done on their behalf87) and never rises to a po-
sition of explicit advocacy. It is a kind of comradeship in struggle, “an activity conducted 
alongside those who struggle for power, and not their illumination from a safe distance.”88 
Indeed, this is what Foucault means by critique. Critique is the careful and deliberate dis-
ruption of existing regimes of power/knowledge “to show that things are not as self-evident 
as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as 
such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult.”89  
Foucault characterizes this critical activity as in service to resistance and part of the 
struggle for social and political transformation; “deep transformation,” he says, must be 
“constantly agitated by a permanent criticism.”90 Critique is therefore not removed or sepa-
rate from politics or political struggle, nor is political resistance without critique unless it is 
supplied by the intellectual class. Rather, these activities are mutually reinforcing and even 
require one another in order to function. It is, in fact, difficult ultimately to distinguish them, 
since critique, in Foucault’s view, is that which consistently resists—both the relations of 
power it documents as well as the provocation to “solve” the problems it raises therein: 
 
Under no circumstances should one pay attention to those who tell one: “Don’t criticize, 
since you’re not capable of carrying out a reform.” That’s ministerial cabinet talk. Critique 
doesn’t have to be the premise of a deduction that concludes, “this, then, is what needs to 
be done.” It should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse 
what is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It 
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doesn’t have to lay down the law for the law. It isn’t a stage in programming. It is a chal-
lenge directed to what is.91 
 
Genealogy, then, as the method of unearthing subjugated knowledges, is the method of cri-
tique, the grounds for a constant and insurrectionary challenge to “what is.” 
 
III. Moralism and Totalitarianism 
Foucault’s methodological and political commitments are all the more significant in light of 
Agamben’s demanded corrective of Foucaultian biopolitics and understanding of sovereign-
ty. For even as Foucault expands his methodological rejection of the state as ahistorical politi-
cal principle or sociological object, Agamben effects not simply a return to sovereignty, as 
already argued, but a return to sovereignty in what, following Foucault, we must recognize 
as totalitarian forms. This is the case not only methodologically, as will become clear, but 
also morally, an aspect of political critique that does not even enter into the Foucaultian 
schema. Methodologically, Agamben’s persistent focus on Auschwitz as the West’s political 
paradigm and Nazism as the teleological culmination of sovereignty’s political trajectory 
results in his offering an “anti-totalitarian” theory of sovereignty that renders any other his-
torical or political outcome besides totalitarianism impossible. Hence Agamben’s dispute 
with Foucault is actually a “corrective” of Foucault, a disappointingly moralizing rebuke 
rather than a constructive scholarly engagement.  
In BB, Foucault says his choice to talk about governmentality rather than the state is 
purposeful, a methodological choice that is “obviously and explicitly a way of not taking as 
a primary, original, and already given object, notions such as the sovereign, sovereignty, the 
people, subjects, the state, and civil society, that is to say, all those universals employed by 
sociological analysis, historical analysis, and political philosophy.”92 Rather, Foucault says, 
he would like to do “exactly the opposite” and, instead of using “state and society, sover-
eign and subjects, etcetera” as points of departure, he wants to show how they “were actual-
ly able to be formed” so that their status can be called into question.93 At one level, this is 
simply Foucault’s methodological preference. At another level, as we have seen, it is a polit-
ical commitment, insofar as refusing to begin with these sociological givens facilitates re-
sistance to the power-effects of what he calls “totalitarian theories.” While, in “SMBD,” 
these totalitarian theories were Marxism and psychoanalysis, in BB the target is now what 
Foucault calls “historicism,” which he describes as a practice of taking universals and run-
ning them through the mill of history in order to deduce their “meaning.” Significantly, his-
toricism, like Marxism and psychoanalysis, unfolds a similarly reductive and deductive log-
ic that “starts from the universal and, as it were, puts it through the grinder of history.”94 
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Instead, Foucault suggests the supposition “that universals do not exist. And then I put the 
question to history and historians: How can you write a history if you do not accept a priori 
the existence of things like the state, society, the sovereign, and subjects?”95 Insofar as histor-
icism in BB functions the way Marxism and psychoanalysis do in “SMBD,” then historicism 
can also be considered a totalitarian theory that Foucault seeks to critique. In seeking to un-
dertake an analysis that is “exactly the opposite of historicism,”96 Foucault is in some sense 
continuing his practice of thwarting or undermining totalitarian theories, a methodology 
that is animated by a specifically political commitment to insurrection.97  
Foucault is also cautious about indulging the fearful discourse of the all-powerful 
state. He names this anxiety “state phobia”98 and says it has two related versions: first,  
 
the idea that the state possesses in itself and through its own dynamism a sort of power of 
expansion, an endogenous imperialism constantly pushing it to spread its surface and in-
crease in extent, depth, and subtlety to the point that it will come to take over entirely that 
which is at the same time its other, its outside, its target, and its object, namely: civil socie-
ty.99  
 
If this leaves the impression of a kind of suffocating beast whose tentacled grasp is ever ex-
tending over and sliding in between any cracks of resistance to its domination, this is no ac-
cident: Foucault refers to this as the “cold monster” version of the state, the “threatening or-
ganism above civil society.”100 Foucault does not spend much time unpacking the problems 
with this theory, presumably because they are self-evident on the basis of his earlier work: 
not only is the state here presupposed as a causal entity that exists “above” its subjects, but 
it is also possessed of a kind of vitalism or life principle that Foucault dismisses out of hand 
as an inadequate or irresponsible account of power. The state as “cold monster” is, quite lit-
erally, yet another version of the Leviathan, the great sea monster from the book of Job, for 
whose beheading Foucault has already vigorously advocated. 
The second bit of “critical commonplace”101 regarding the state that Foucault seeks to 
avoid is the notion that there are no significant differences between or among different 
forms of it. This is the notion that, as Foucault puts it, 
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there is a kinship, a sort of genetic continuity or evolutionary implication between differ-
ent forms of the state, with the administrative state, the welfare state, the bureaucratic 
state, the fascist state, and the totalitarian state all being, in no matter which of the various 
analyses, the successive branches of one and the same great tree of state control in its con-
tinuous and unified expansion.102 
 
Here Foucault explicitly puts totalitarianism and the state together in order to distinguish 
“the totalitarian state” as a distinctive state form, rather than the paradigm case of the state 
itself. Indeed, here we might understand Foucault as attempting to disentangle a kind of 
doubling of totalitarianism in state phobia, wherein the cold monster view anoints the state 
with the kind of omniscience and omnipotence often ascribed to totalitarian versions of it. 
This specifically totalitarian version ultimately becomes synonymous with the state itself.  
What links the “cold monster” view and the “genetic continuity” view is their con-
sideration of the state as a malevolent principle in itself, such that distinctions among types 
become irrelevant and any state action can be interpreted as a sign of its increasing repres-
siveness and violence. Foucault uses the example of an unduly harsh criminal sentence, 
which he says can be interpreted as evidence of the increasing fascism of the state, regard-
less of whatever may actually be true—this is once again a correct answer produced by the 
particular truth mill that is “state phobia.” Foucault warns that this kind of thinking can 
verge on paranoid fantasy, which sees evidence of the ever-growing, increasingly-fascistic 
state everywhere it looks. In this case, one’s “grasp of reality”103 is not what matters, but ra-
ther the endless confirmation and reproduction of the theory itself. It can also issue in ab-
surd conclusions, such as the following: 
 
As soon as we accept the existence of this continuity or genetic kinship between different 
forms of the state, and as soon as we attribute a constant evolutionary dynamism to the 
state, it then becomes possible not only to use different analyses to support each other, but 
also to refer them back to each other and so deprive them of their specificity. For example, 
an analysis of social security and the administrative apparatus on which it rests ends up, 
via some slippages and thanks to some plays on words, referring us to the analysis of con-
centration camps. And, in the move from social security to concentration camps the requi-
site specificity of analysis is diluted.104 
 
While Foucault is referencing right-wing fantasies about governmental power (one is re-
minded of Sarah Palin’s warnings about “death panels” should Obama’s Affordable Health 
Care Act pass the U.S. Congress), his caution is also apposite to left anarchist discourses that 
similarly see the state as a malevolent principle in itself. In suggesting that the state has no 
essence or is “nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentali-
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ties,”105 Foucault is not claiming that we should be uncritical of the state or exercises of state 
power. Quite the opposite. In destabilizing the operative presumptions about the state in 
history, sociology, philosophy, and politics, Foucault is instead working to make the state 
something that is possible to critique and resist. We lose sight of this possibility when the 
state is presumed to be a prime mover of history or politics, an omnipotent principle or an 
essentially annihilatory institution that culminates, inevitably, in the genocidal logic of con-
centration camps. Part of the task of proceeding in the exact opposite manner as that of his-
toricism is admitting that mechanisms of power are transferable and that they do not ex-
haustively characterize any particular society.106 Foucault’s resistance to historicism and 
state phobia, then, are yet further resistances to totalitarianism—of theory (or science) but 
also of specific state forms and beliefs about the state and its forms that function in totalitar-
ian ways. 
 As is perhaps already evident, Agamben’s approach to the state in Homo Sacer epit-
omizes both the historicism and state phobia that Foucault explicitly rejects. Rather than 
seeking, from below, to untangle and document the subjugated knowledges that have pro-
duced existing dominations, Agamben instead seeks to read these latter for what they reveal 
about the essential workings of Western politics. Indeed, Agamben presumes that power 
inheres in the sovereign demarcation of the zoē/bios divide, the status of which exhaustively 
defines life and politics in “the West” (itself an underspecified geographical and historical 
entity). The method of Homo Sacer is thus clearly expressed in Foucault’s description of “his-
toricism”: Agamben starts from a universalist claim regarding the sovereign exception and 
then proceeds to examine how history has inflected it in the West. This is what allows him 
to conflate all versions of the state with the totalitarian one and also to suggest that all ver-
sions of sovereignty culminate inevitably in the Nazis’ creation of concentration camps. As 
he says, the camp is “the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity, whose met-
amorphoses and disguises we will have to learn to recognize.”107  
Like all declension narratives, this one too echoes the chronology of the fall from 
grace, except that, in Agamben’s version, the pre-lapsarian moment dates from Aristotle ra-
ther than the Creation. The result, however, is a valorized hypostatization of an at-best 
questionable moment of origin, from which the logic of the events of Western history can be 
understood to have unfolded and to be still in the process of unfolding to this day.108 At one 
end, then (at “the beginning,” or archē), stands the Aristotelian distinction between zoē and 
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bios; at the other end (“now,” or in modernity), lie the Nazi death camps. These two mo-
ments are tied inevitably, irretrievably together by the exceptional logic of sovereignty: 
 
The totalitarianism of our century has its ground in this dynamic identity of life and politics, with-
out which it remains incomprehensible. If Nazism still appears to us as an enigma, and if its 
affinity with Stalinism (on which Hannah Arendt so much insisted) is still unexplained, 
this is because we have failed to situate the totalitarian phenomenon in its entirety in the 
horizon of biopolitics. When life and politics—originally divided, and linked together by 
means of the no-man’s-land of the state of exception that is inhabited by bare life—begin 
to become one, all life becomes sacred and all politics becomes the exception (148, original 
emphasis). 
 
Nazism will remain “an enigma,” on this telling, insofar as we fail to “situate” it within the 
essential principle of Western biopolitics—the sovereign exception, the zoē/bios divide. Once 
we do that, however, the meaning of Nazism becomes clear and we understand how there 
could ever have been death camps, perhaps the real question Agamben is trying to answer 
in this text. Already latent in the zoē/bios divide, then, is the concentration camp, which is 
why its historical development inevitably culminates there.  
Agamben’s political theory thus not only re-iterates the assumptions of the sovereign 
model as Foucault explains it, but itself becomes a kind of totalitarian theory of sovereignty 
in the West that can only ever issue in the same answer over and over again: the camp. 
Agamben’s methodological historicism is what allows him to come to the political conclu-
sions Foucault explicitly repudiates above; namely, that there is no meaningful difference 
between democratic states and totalitarian ones, and this because the sovereign exception is 
a formation of power that fundamentally defines the entity “Western politics” from its earli-
est days through to its catastrophic contemporaneity. Thus it is perhaps also unsurprising 
that Agamben concludes there is no difference between democratic and totalitarian regimes 
insofar as their “fundamental referent” is bare life; the “only real question to be decided,” he 
says, is “which form of organization would be best suited to the task of assuring the care, 
control, and use of bare life.”109 As well, Agamben’s state phobia, in which we can recognize 
both the “cold monster” and “genetic” versions, predictably culminates, as do the absurdist 
theories Foucault documents, with nothing other than concentration camps. Unless the enig-
ma of the sovereign exception is solved, Agamben insists, we will remain mired in totalitarian-
ism and death camps: “Today politics knows no value (and, consequently, no nonvalue) 
other than life, and until the contradictions that this fact implies are dissolved, Nazism and 
fascism—which transformed the decision on bare life into the supreme political principle—
will remain stubbornly with us.”110 The consequence of Agamben’s methodology here is not 
simply a return to sovereignty, then, but in fact a resurrection of the sovereign and the res-
toration of his omnipotence in what, following Foucault, can be called totalitarian forms. 
Agamben’s reading of the text of Western politics from the guiding principle of the sover-
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eign exception leaves us no other option, no other conclusion, than that with which Foucault 
claims his work is constantly being misinterpreted as saying: “This is the way things are; 
you are trapped.”111 This outcome is all the more ironic, of course, given that the entire exer-
cise of Homo Sacer was ostensibly spurred by Agamben’s desire to “correct” Foucault’s over-
sight regarding 20th century totalitarian regimes and, presumably, overcome the disastrous 
legacy of Nazism and totalitarianism.  
Of course, in response to the question/accusation that Foucault did not take the death 
camps into account in his biopolitical considerations, “[d]espite,” Agamben sniffs, “what 
one might have legitimately expected,”112 Mark Mazower notes, “One answer might be that 
Foucault did not think they were the exemplary places of modern biopolitics.”113 Another 
might be that Foucault did not overlook them, and that they in fact appear in Foucault’s 
theorization of racism, race war discourse, and state racism in “Society Must Be Defended.”114 
Yet another might be that Foucault did not extensively analyze either totalitarianism or the 
concentration camps because, unlike sovereignty, discipline, or governmentality, Foucault 
did not see either as definitive—of modernity or of one another. So, for example, of the 
camps, Foucault says: 
 
The concentration camps? They’re considered to be a British invention; but that doesn’t 
mean, or authorize the notion, that Britain was a totalitarian country. If there is one coun-
try that was not totalitarian in the history of Europe, it is undoubtedly Britain—but Britain 
invented concentration camps, which have been one of the chief instruments of totalitari-
an regimes. This is an example of a transposition of a technique of power. But I’ve never 
said, and I’m not inclined to think, that the existence of concentration camps in both dem-
ocratic and totalitarian countries shows that there are no differences between those coun-
tries.115  
 
Here Foucault rejects two of Agamben’s central conclusions: first, the notion that the camp 
is what defines totalitarianism, and second, the notion that there is no difference between 
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democratic or totalitarian countries (even if both can be observed to have used the camp as a 
technique of power). Regarding “totalitarianism” itself, Foucault says: 
 
I feel skeptical about the assumption that this question [of power] has been raised for the 
first time in the twentieth century. Anyway, for us it is not only a theoretical question but 
part of our experience. I’d like to mention only two “pathological forms”—those two 
“diseases of power”—fascism and Stalinism. One of the numerous reasons why they are 
so puzzling for us is that, in spite of their historical uniqueness, they are not quite original. 
They used and extended mechanisms already present in most other societies. More than 
that: in spite of their own internal madness, they used, to a large extent, the ideas and the 
devices of our political rationality.116  
 
Here Foucault not only refrains from collapsing Stalinism and fascism together into the sin-
gle form of totalitarianism, but he also resists the claim that these are distinctly new or mod-
ern political formations (both of which are presumed to be among the contributions of Ar-
endt’s Origins of Totalitarianism). Thus, we might see a kind of reversal of Agamben’s disa-
greement with Foucault: whereas Agamben does not think that biopolitics is distinctly 
modern, Foucault does not think that “totalitarianism” is distinctly modern (if he even 
thinks it is a thing). The point here is not that the death camps are insignificant for Foucault; 
rather, it is that they do not represent the dramatic culmination of the movement of Western 
political history for the last more than 200 centuries—a completely un-Foucaultian, un-
genealogical lesson drawn from a methodological approach Foucault explicitly rejects. 
While the camps’ (relative) absence from Foucault’s speculations about power may be 
noteworthy, it is so particularly noteworthy to Agamben—so noteworthy that it merits a 
pentalogy of books to correct—because he simply cannot imagine an account of power in 
“the West” that does not center the Holocaust and somehow culminate in it. Indeed, Agam-
ben’s question for Foucault is not what he might have said about the camps, or how he 
might analyze them, or how his biopolitical analyses might apply to the camps. Instead, 
Agamben shakes his head in disbelief that Foucault did not consider the camps in his biopo-
litical writings and also that he did not read his near contemporary Hannah Arendt on this 
subject. Thus, Agamben sighs, it is necessary to correct where Foucault went astray so as to 
better understand the truly relevant feature of modernity, the Nazi death camp, the para-
digm for all politics and political spaces. 
The issue is not whether Foucault should be questioned about his relative inclusion 
of the camps in his political analyses, but rather that Agamben is suggesting that, because 
Foucault failed either to theorize the camps as crucial to modern biopolitics or conclude that 
the camp is the fundamental paradigm of biopolitics, his analysis of biopolitics is fundamen-
tally untrustworthy and even, possibly, complicit with modern biopolitical excesses. This 
interpretive intransigence is the effect of Agamben’s moralizing fixation on the Holocaust—
or, more typically, Auschwitz, “a metonym he employs and apparently finds unproblemat-
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ic”117—which constitutes the beginning point of this text and, therefore, its inevitable con-
clusion. In other words, in Homo Sacer (and, even more markedly, in Remnants of Auschwitz), 
Agamben indulges in a kind of “Holocaust exceptionalism” wherein the Holocaust is both 
the center and the apex of politics, political events, and political history (if not also of politi-
cal “evil,” a term that proliferates in Holocaust exceptionalist discourses). To overlook the 
Holocaust, to fail to center it, is somehow to be complicit in its being overwritten, ignored, 
minimized, or denied. This moralizing exceptionalism is at the heart of Agamben’s repri-
mand of Foucault. 
All this is difficult to recognize insofar as it is at odds with both Agamben’s self-
presentation in this text as well as his public political positions. On the one hand, Agamben 
seems to be on the side of the subjugated insofar as he is critically examining genocide—a 
genocide typically assigned the status of singularity (whether in terms of vastness, grue-
someness, or efficiency), and one that seems to hold the key to unlocking a meta-critique of 
Western politics as a whole. On the other hand, Agamben can draw conclusions from this 
position and perspective only insofar as he has alighted on the sole proper analysis of the 
present moment. Therefore, what remains is to draw conclusions from it and analyze con-
temporary developments from within its frame (e.g., that fingerprinting and retinal meas-
urements of foreign visitors to the U.S. is akin to tattooing Auschwitz inmates with prisoner 
numbers) and, if necessary, refuse them (“we must oppose it”).  
Foucaultian criticism, by contrast, resists such easy diagnostics and political position-
ings. Indeed, Foucaultian political analysis resists any notion that it is obvious who the op-
pressors are and problematizes the very notion of oppression as it is typically understood. It 
is much more likely that we are complicit in our own subjectification and that power’s an-
chors cannot be decisively or definitively located. Yet, to briefly recall the disputes of the 
1990s, this is not to say that Foucault is apolitical, antipolitical, or makes contestation and 
political resistance impossible because “power is everywhere.” Rather, it is to proliferate the 
possibilities for resistance, which themselves cannot be known in advance and which are 
therefore never pat, self-righteous, or morally reassuring.  
Indeed, there is a comforting sanctimoniousness in Agamben’s condemnatory posi-
tion regarding biopolitics, a security and moralism that Foucaultian critique inevitably es-
chews. But it is precisely this refusal that makes what Foucault sometimes calls “practices of 
freedom” possible. It is only in Agamben’s view of the world, wherein the malevolent sov-
ereign exception renders all else unthinkable, that the only options are redemption or the 
death camp. Ironically, then, in seeking to accord the Holocaust due weight and importance, 
Agamben’s exceptionalizing of this historical set of events becomes its own coercive dis-
course. After all, it is only in comparison with the singularity of the Holocaust that it could 
be a credible accusation that Foucault has failed to consider the Holocaust sufficiently and 
condemn it. Indeed, Foucault’s ostensible failure here is rather the effect of Agamben’s Holo-
caust exceptionalism, which often exempts its practitioner from critical scrutiny (given the 
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righteousness of her/his endeavor in examining the Holocaust in the first place) and exerts a 
disciplinary function by silencing those who disagree or have a different analytic frame-
work, since dissent of this type becomes complicity with those who would deny the im-
portance of the Holocaust and, potentially, suggest it did not happen.118 In resuscitating 
sovereignty and re-affirming the inevitable, teleological power of the state to culminate in 
the camp, Agamben produces a totalitarian theory that demands, ironically, the repudiation 
of totalitarianism. This is the effect of his moralizing fixation on the Holocaust that, even 
more painfully and ironically, only serves to re-center Nazi power by perennially re-
invigorating it as historical occurrence, ongoing political legacy, and catastrophic fatality, 
rather than resisting or disrupting it via insurrectionary critique.  
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